Utah v. Louie Edwin Sims : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Utah v. Louie Edwin Sims : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; attorney for respondent.
Jan Graham; attorney general; David B. Thompson; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
petitioner.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Sims, No. 910218.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3535
^!024S 
IN THE SUPREME COURT C r\r:* mtir STATE O^ TTHIAU 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner 
and Cross-Respondent, 890463 CIA 




BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




Assistant Attorney Ger 
236 State Capi- . "! 
Salt Lake f.itv ; • • 
Attorneys for Petiixv 
Cross-Responder.t 
::vd 
G. FRED METOS (2250) 
72 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent and 
Cros s-Petitioner 
F IIL IE! D 
M l A l l |JW 
CLERK B»rwrmum 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross-Petitioner, 
Case No. 910218 
Ct. of App. No. 890463-CA 
Category No. 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAN GRAHAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Petitioner and 
Cros s-Respondent 
G. FRED METOS (2250) 
72 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent and 
Cross-Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW . . 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE ROADBLOCK WAS PER SE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EXPRESS STATUTORY 
AUTHORIZATION FOR ROADBLOCKS 6 
POINT II THE COURT OF APPEALS' APPLICATION OF STATE V. 
ARROYO AND THIS COURT'S APPLICATION OF ARROYO 
TO THE SAME DEFENDANT AND THE SAME FACTS IN 
SIMS V. STATE TAX COMM'N ARE INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN STATE V. 
THURMAN 
A. Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman . . . . 14 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 
(Utah), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 841 (1990) 1 
Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260 
(Kan. 1992) 10 
Inaersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987) 10 
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990) 4, 12 
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(1987) 9 
Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1990) 10 
People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 
128 cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979) 10 
Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992) 5-7, 11-13, 
16, 18-19 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) . . .2, 4, 6, 13-14, 18-19 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986) 19 
State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 
(1988) 9 
State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 10 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 11 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1993) 1, 3-5, 7-9, 
16-18 
State v. Sims. No. 910218 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993) 4 
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 1984) 9 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) . . . 2, 6, 14-16, 18-19 
ii 
United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 1389 (10th 
Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 486 U.S. 1054 
(1988) 16 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const. Amend. IV 4-6, 10, 17, 19 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 2, 5-7, 10-11, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914 (Supp. 1992) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2 (1991) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-10-4 (1989) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1988) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-101 through -105 (Supp. 1992) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1992) 1 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner : Case No. 910218 
and Cross-Respondent, Ct. of App. No. 890463-CA 
v. 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross-Petitioner. : 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for review of State v. Sims, 808 
P.2d 141 (Utah App.)/ cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1993) 
(a copy of which is attached as an addendum). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that 
the roadblock stop of defendant was per se unconstitutional under 
the Utah Constitution because it was not expressly authorized by 
statute? 
Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question 
of law; thus, this Court reviews the court of appeals' legal 
conclusion without deference. See City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 841 
(1990) . 
2. Did the court of appeals properly apply this 
Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in 
holding that defendant's consent to search was not valid and that 
the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to his consent was 
therefore not admissible? 
This also presents a question of law, and therefore the 
Court owes no deference to the court of appeals' application of 
Arroyo. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) 
(Supp, 1988) (R. 7). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the contraband seized from his car by the police during a 
roadblock stop (R. 12, 22-56). An evidentiary hearing 
2 
established that defendant was stopped, along with numerous other 
vehicles, at a roadblock set up by the police for the purpose of 
"detect[ing] driver's license, automobile registration, and 
equipment violations, as well as liquor and drug violations." 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 142 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 
P.2d (Utah 1993). After being stopped at the 
roadblock, defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, 
including the trunk, which revealed small amounts of marijuana 
and a kilogram brick of cocaine. Ibid. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, 
ruling that "(1) the roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or 
federal constitutions; (2) [defendant] voluntarily consented to 
the search of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3) [the 
officer who conducted the search] had probable cause to continue 
searching the trunk after [defendant]'s withdrawal of consent." 
Id. at 143. 
Subsequently, defendant was convicted of the charged 
offense after a bench trial based on stipulated facts (R. 142-
45). The court sentenced him to a term of one to fifteen years 
at the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay a fine of $1,250 
and an additional $312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund (Id.). 
The court then suspended the prison term and placed defendant on 
eighteen months' probation (Id.K 
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police 
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal 
3 
and state constitutions/ and therefore the contraband seized from 
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed. 
The court of appeals held that the roadblock violated the Fourth 
Amendment under Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990)/ and that it also violated article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution because the roadblock was not expressly 
authorized by statute. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 145-50. It 
further held that, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990)/ defendant's consent to the search of his vehicle was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid 
the taint of that initial illegality/ and therefore the consent 
was invalid. Id. at 150-52. 
This Court granted certiorari. State v. Sims, No. 
910218 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court accurately summarized the facts of this case 
in a related tax case involving the same defendant and the same 
incident: 
On July 27/ 1988/ the Utah Highway Patrol 
and the Juab County Sheriff's Department set 
up a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 
approximately two miles outside of Nephi/ 
Utah. When Sims' car was stopped at the 
roadblock, the officers observed an open 
container of alcohol in the back seat area. 
Sims was asked to exit the car, at which time 
he consented to a search of the interior. 
There, the officers discovered the remnants 
of one or two marijuana cigarettes. Sims 
then consented to a search of the trunk. 
When the latter search revealed two small 
plastic bags containing marijuana, Sims 
stated that he wanted the search stopped. 
Asserting that they had probable cause to 
continue, the officers inspected the spare 
tire well, uncovering a kilogram brick of 
-4-
cocaine. Sims was then arrested for driving 
unde. he influence of alcohol and possession 
of a ..ntrolled substance with intent to 
distr-; "e. 
Sims v. State Ta. nm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1992). The 
roadblock was set wt "to detect driver's license, vehicle 
registration, and equipment violations, as well as liquor and 
drug violations." State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 142.x 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the court of appeals correctly ruled that the 
roadblock in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, it 
erroneously concluded that the roadblock was per se 
tkrsder the. s-fca+e, cons+i+u+iow 
unconstitutional because it was not expressly authorized by 
statute. The better reasoned view is that the police had implied 
statutory authority to set up the roadblock and the absence of 
express statutory authority did not render the device per se 
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, express 
statutory authorization is not a prerequisite to a determination 
that a particular law enforcement practice is constitutional. 
Because the court of appeals' novel state constitutional holding 
has far reaching implications for Utah's search and seizure law, 
this Court should reverse that holding. 
The court of appeals' additional holding that 
defendant's consent to the search of his car was not valid under 
1
 Specifically, one of the supervising officers "instructed 
officers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle registration of 
the stopped motorists; while doing this, they were to watch for 
signs of liquor and drug violations." Sims, 808 P.2d at 14 3. 
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the exploitation prong of the test set forth in State v. Arrovo, 
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), is inconsistent with this Court's 
clarification of the Arrovo test in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993). This Court's similar holding in Sims v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). is also ittCoKsigfeK^ f u/i"B» *~fhnrh*cLn 
Because the roadblock stop of defendant did not 
constitute flagrant or purposeful police misconduct, the absence 
of a significant time period or intervening circumstances between 
the illegal stop and defendant's consent to search is not 
critical. In short, under Thurman's analysis of Arrovo's 
exploitation prong, defendant's consent was not obtained through 
exploitation of the illegal stop. That consent was valid, and 
therefore the evidence seized either directly or indirectly 
pursuant to the consent was admissible. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' contrary holding and overrule its own contrary holding 
in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE ROADBLOCK WAS PER SE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EXPRESS STATUTORY 
AUTHORIZATION FOR ROADBLOCKS 
After the court of appeals ruled that the roadblock in 
this case violated the Fourth Amendment under Sitz, a ruling the 
State does not challenge, it then held that the roadblock was per 
se unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution because there was no express statutory authority for 
-6-
such roadblocks. Sims, 808 P.2d at 149. The court did not 
resolve the question of whether the officers had implied 
authority to conduct the roadblock, even though it appears that 
authority could be inferred from the statutes that pertain to the 
general authority of law enforcement officers. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1992), 17-22-2 (1991), 27-10-4(a) & 
(b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988). But see Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 
841 P.2d at 9 (where two Justices "decline to infer authority for 
suspicionless investigatory stops from broad statutory 
directives"). 
Although the legislature has since enacted statutes 
authorizing roadblocks of the type used in this case, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-101 through -105 (Supp. 1992), this Court should 
nevertheless review the court of appeals' novel interpretation of 
the state constitution. The court of appeals' holding amounts to 
a broad conclusion that certain warrantless law enforcement 
techniques require express legislative authorization before they 
can be constitutional under the Utah Constitution. Left intact, 
this conclusion has the potential to fundamentally alter the law 
of search and seizure in this state. 
In holding that the roadblock here violated the state 
constitution, the court of appeals reasoned that this Court's 
emphasis on the warrant requirement under article I, section 14, 
coupled with the legislature's independent action in authorizing 
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints, required that the 
legislature expressly authorize suspicionless, investigatory 
roadblocks before they could be constitutional under the state 
-7-
constitution. Sims, 808 P.2d at 148-49- The court made the 
rather remarkable observation that "in authorizing [ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints], our legislature has, 
presumably, weighed the need for such suspicionless inspections 
against their intrusion upon individual liberty, a process 
analogous to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a 
warrant." Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
The fundamental flaw in this latter statement is that 
when considering an application for a warrant, a magistrate is 
concerned only with whether there is probable cause; he or she 
does not engage in weighing the need for a warrant against the 
intrusion upon individual liberty. A warrant and the attendant 
intrusion upon an individual's liberty are constitutional if 
supported by probable cause; the magistrate's determination of 
whether a search is constitutionally justified does not go beyond 
the probable cause determination. 
The legislature, on the other hand, while obviously 
concerned with the constitutionality of its enactments, does not 
determine the constitutionality of a particular police practice. 
Although it may prohibit certain police practices that the courts 
consider constitutional, such a statutory prohibition does not 
render the police practice unconstitutional; rather, the practice 
is merely illegal — that is, prohibited by statute. Likewise, 
the legislature does not render a police practice constitutional 
simply because it authorizes the practice by statute. Nor is 
there any logical basis for the proposition that legislative 
approval is a prerequisite to a judicial determination that a 
-8-
certain police conduct is constitutional. 
In short, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded 
that the legislature performs a judicial function, akin to that 
of a magistrate or an appellate court, in determining the 
constitutionality of a particular police practice. See Sims, 808 
P.2d at 152 (Orme, J., concurring specially). Whether police 
conduct is constitutional is ultimately a question for the 
courts, not the legislature. 
Although the court of appeals finds support for its 
novel view in Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(1987), and State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 1984)2, the 
better reasoned position is that adopted by the Appellate Court 
of Illinois in a case upholding a vehicle safety equipment 
checkpoint: 
Criminal statutes do contain an implied 
right of police to enforce them. While there 
are state and federal constitutional 
limitations on the means of enforcement, 
these limits are constitutional and not 
inherent in every criminal statute. The 
State has passed laws requiring safety 
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary 
intent, the police should be able to enforce 
those laws in a constitutional manner. 
. . . . 
We are loath to say that the State has 
anything but a strong interest in seeing that 
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the 
2
 The court of appeals also cited State v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of its position. 
That case is distinguishable from Nelson and Smith, in that the 
Idaho Legislature had explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to 
situations where officers desired to "apprehend[J persons 
reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for a violation 
of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United 
States[.]•• Id. at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-621). 
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absence of any intent to provide otherwise, 
the safety equipment statutes carry with them 
an implied right of the officers to inspect 
autos in any constitutional manner. 
People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-34, 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). Other courts have concluded 
that roadblocks are constitutional in the absence of explicit 
statutory authority. Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 843 P.2d 
260 (Kan. 1992); Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo. 1990); 
Inaersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1318 (Cal. 1987). 
There are numerous law enforcement practices involving 
suspicionless and warrantless searches or seizures which this 
Court has recognized as constitutionally permissible and 
otherwise proper even though there is no explicit statutory 
authority. For example, there is no explicit statutory authority 
for searches incident to arrest or inventory searches, both of 
which may be conducted without suspicion or a warrant. See, 
e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) 
(recognizing search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements); State v. 
Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that suspicionless 
and warrantless inventory searches are permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution). 
The court of appeals' state constitutional analysis casts doubt 
on the propriety of these police practices. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, the 
appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any law enforcement 
practice is to ask whether it is constitutional, not whether it 
is explicitly authorized by statute. While the particular 
-10-
practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a 
-fo 
peace officer, explicit authority is not required for it^be 
constitutional. 
In Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, Justice Durham's lead 
opinion, in which only Justice Zimmerman joined, essentially 
adopted all of the court of appeals' reasoning in State v. Sims 
concerning the requirement of explicit statutory authority for 
roadblocks before they could be constitutional under article I, 
section 14. 841 P.2d at 8-9. Relying heavily on the "court's 
commitment to the warrant approach under our state constitution," 
as expressed in the two Justice lead opinion in State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, 
J.), Justice Durham concluded that "as a matter of law, the 
roadblock stop [of defendant] was unconstitutional under the Utah 
Constitution." Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 8. 
Suspicionless, investigatory roadblocks were neither implicitly 
nor explicitly authorized by statute. Id. at 9. Furthermore, 
neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances supported the 
warrantless roadblock at which defendant was stopped. Id. at 8-
9-
Justice Durham's analysis was specifically limited to a 
"suspicionless, investigatory, nonemergency roadblock," and did 
not extend to "emergency roadblocks that might be used, for 
example, to apprehend a fleeing felon," "any existing authority 
to conduct roadblocks for traffic control purposes," or "port of 
entry or fish and game roadblocks conducted pursuant to statute." 
Id. at 8 n.3. 
-11-
However, concurring in the result, Justice Stewart 
severely criticized Justice Durham, observing that "her sweeping 
opinion represents the views of only two justices of this Court 
and is therefore not the law of the state." Id. at 15 (Stewart, 
J., concurring in result)3. He also noted that "her opinion 
raises more difficult issues than it settles with respect to the 
legality of roadblocks." Ibid. 
Specifically, Justice Stewart concluded that the 
roadblock was clearly unconstitutional under federal law, 
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and 
thus Justice Durham's conclusion that the roadblock violated the 
Utah Constitution is dictum. He further suggested that Justice 
Durham's opinion "would make all preplanned, suspicionless 
roadblocks illegal, including roadblocks intended to remove 
intoxicated drivers from the highways or to enforce automobile 
safety measures." Id. at 16. 
Thus, the lead opinion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n does 
not represent the view of a majority of this Court. Insofar as 
that opinion endorses the court of appeals' view that a roadblock 
is per se unconstitutional under the state constitution unless 
there is express legislative authorization for the roadblock, it 
should be rejected. As previously argued, explicit legislative 
authorization is not a prerequisite to a determination that 
certain warrantless law enforcement activity is constitutional. 
3
 Associate Chief Justice Howe, joined by the Chief Justice, 
dissented on the ground that the exclusionary rule should not 
apply in a proceeding before the Tax Commission. 841 P.2d at 16-
21 (Howe, A.C.J., dissenting). 
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To summarize, the notion that certain law enforcement 
techniques must have explicit legislative authorization before 
they can be constitutional under the state constitution 
erroneously places in the hands of the legislature the primary 
role of declaring the constitutionality of police conduct. 
Ultimate questions concerning the constitutionality of government 
action are reserved for the courts, not the legislature* 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the court of appeals' state 
constitutional holding on the ground that the absence of express 
statutory authorization for a particular law enforcement practice 
does not render that practice per se unconstitutional under 
article I, section 14. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' APPLICATION OF STATE V. 
ARROYO AND THIS COURT'S APPLICATION OF ARROYO 
TO THE SAME DEFENDANT AND THE SAME FACTS IN 
SIMS V. STATE TAX COMM'N ARE INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN STATE V. 
THURMAN 
The court of appeals held that defendant's consent to 
the search of his car lacked attenuation from the initial, 
illegal roadblock stop, and therefore the evidence seized 
pursuant to that consent was inadmissible under State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). A majority of this Court reached the 
same conclusion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 10 
(Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.)/ 15 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result), a drug stamp tax case involving this 
defendant and the same incident. Thus, the Court has resolved 
the exclusion issue against the State. However, the Court may 
wish to reexamine that issue because the Court's holding is at 
-13-
odds with the attenuation analysis set forth in State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
A. Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman 
In Arroyo, the Court "held that a defendant's consent 
to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the 
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met: 
(i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was 
not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688). In 
Thurman, the Court clarified how the exploitation (attenuation) 
prong of the Arroyo test is to be applied. 
Thurman began by stating that "Arroyo's primary goal 
was to deter the police from engaging in illegal conduct even 
though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the 
subsequent search." 846 P.2d at 1263. Having identified the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule as the basis for 
Arroyo's exploitation prong, the Court reiterated the factors to 
be considered in assessing the validity of a consent to search 
that follows illegal police conduct: "[(1)] 'the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct,' [(2)] the 'temporal 
proximity' of the illegality and the consent, and [(3)] 'the 
presence of intervening circumstances.'" Ibid, (citations 
omitted). The Court then discussed each factor, emphasizing the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
The Court made clear that the "purpose and flagrancy" 
factor is the most significant of the three because it "directly 
relates to the deterrent value of suppression." Ibid, (citations 
-14-
omitted). Therefore, the first task under the exploitation prong 
is to determine the nature and degree of the police illegality 
based on a continuum of "flagrancy" or "purpose." 
To put the continuum in perspective, it must first be 
recognized that "'[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right.'" Ibid, (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 612 (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting Michigan 
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Thus, at one end of the 
continuum is police misconduct that is "flagrantly abusive, [such 
that] there is greater likelihood that the police engaged in the 
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives," or instances 
where "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the consent." 
Id. (citations omitted). In such cases, "suppressing the 
resulting evidence will have a greater likelihood of deterring 
similar misconduct in the future." Ibid, (citation and footnote 
omitted). 
At the other extreme are instances where "the police 
had no 'purpose' in engaging in the misconduct[.] [F]or example, 
if the illegality arose because [a court] later invalidated a 
statute on which the police had relied in good faith[,] 
suppression would have no deterrent value." Ibid, (citations 
omitted). 
With this continuum in mind, Thurman then described the 
relationship between the flagrancy factor and the other two 
factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances. 
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Specifically, "the exploitation analysis requires a balancing of 
the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and 
circumstances that intervene before the consent is given." Ibid. 
(emphasis added). The Court explained: 
The nature and degree of the illegality will 
usually be inversely related to the 
effectiveness of time and intervening events 
to dissipate the presumed taint. Where the 
misconduct is extreme, we will require a 
clean break in the chain of events between 
the misconduct and the consent to find the 
consent valid. . . . Conversely, where it 
appears that the illegality arose as the 
result of negligence, the lapse of time 
between the misconduct and the consent and 
the presence of intervening events become 
less critical to the dissipation of the 
taint. 
Ibid, (citation omitted). 
Thurman's clarification of how the nature and degree of 
the illegality are balanced against the intervening time and 
circumstances stands in marked contrast to this Court's and the 
court of appeals' application of the exploitation prong to the 
facts of the instant case. At the time the roadblock was set up, 
no decision from either the Utah appellate courts or the United 
States Supreme Court had directly ruled on the legality of such 
roadblocks. See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at 142-50. In fact, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that police 
roadblocks for the purpose of checking driver's license and 
vehicle registration were constitutional. United States v. 
Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 486 
U.S. 1054 (1988). It was not until Sitz, State v. Sims, and Sims 
v. State Tax Comm'n were issued that it became clear the 
roadblock at issue here was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
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Amendment and article I, section 14. Thus, the roadblock could 
not fairly be characterized as a flagrant violation of the 
federal or state constitution. 
While it is not clear that the Sims panel actually 
concluded that the police misconduct was flagrant, it seemed to 
suggest that the roadblock constituted a flagrant constitutional 
violation because (1) "[t]he troopers each had years of law 
enforcement experience, and [could] properly be charged with 
awareness that their action was not authorized by law," and (2) 
11
 [u]sing ten to twelve law officers to staff the roadblock may 
have left distant parts of the largely rural jurisdiction with 
delayed police assistance in the event of need." 808 P.2d at 
151. 
As noted, no state or federal decision on the books at 
the time of the roadblock in this case would have made clear to 
the officers that it was unconstitutional. To require of the 
officers the clairvoyance necessary to anticipate Sitz and the 
court of appeals' unique state constitutional holding is 
unreasonable. Furthermore, the court of appeals' criticism of 
the use of law enforcement resources, beyond being speculative 
and outside any particular expertise of the judiciary, does not 
form a basis for concluding that the officers were guilty of a 
flagrant or purposeful constitutional violation. 
In concluding that the defendant's "consent to search 
his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal 
roadblock," the court of appeals relied most heavily on two 
factors: (1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of the 
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illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of 
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop 
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between 
the two"; and (2) "the record reveal[ed] no possibility of 
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and the grant 
of consent to the search." Sims, 808 P.2d at 150-51. 
Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation 
prong, it was not unreasonable for the court of appeals to 
interpret Arroyo as requiring a clean break in the chain of 
events between a prior police illegality (whether or not 
flagrant) and the subsequent consent for the consent to be valid. 
However, Thurman clearly rejected this approach. 
It is not clear why in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, which 
was issued less than three months before Thurman, the Court did 
not apply Thurman's analysis. It simply devoted but one sentence 
to the flagrancy factor: "The purpose of the roadblock was to 
obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose that does 
nothing to reduce the 'flagrancy' of the constitutional violation 
it precipitated." Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 10. The 
Court never explained why the roadblock constituted a "flagrant" 
violation in the first place, given that there was at least one 
decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that apparently 
approved such roadblocks and no decision from a Utah appellate 
court or the United States Supreme Court holding such roadblocks 
unconstitutional. 
Insofar as the court of appeals held that a consent 
search is automatically invalidated if the voluntary consent is 
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closely connected in time and by circumstance to the prior police 
illegality, it is wrong. The same is true of this Court's 
similar holding in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. As Thurman makes 
clear, if the violation by the police is not flagrant or 
purposeful, temporal proximity or the absence of intervening 
circumstances between the illegality and the consent is not 
significant. 
In sum, police exploitation of the illegal roadblock 
stop is not made out in this case. The court of appeals' and 
this Court's conclusion to the contrary is simply inconsistent 
with Thurman. In that defendant does not challenge the 
voluntariness of his consent, Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 
at 9 n.8, that consent was valid under the Arroyo two-part test 
as clarified by Thurman. Thus, the incriminating evidence, which 
was obtained either directly or indirectly pursuant to that 
consent*, was admissible. No deterrent purpose would be served 
by excluding the evidence. Accordingly, the court of appeals' 
contrary holding should be reversed and this Court's contrary 
holding in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
* Once defendant had withdrawn his consent for the search of 
the trunk, the searching officer, who by then had discovered two 
small bags of marijuana in the trunk, obviously had probable 
cause to continue his search under the automobile exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See State v. Dorsev, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (discussing the automobile 
exception). 
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reverse the court of appeals and affirm defendant's conviction, 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lp& day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
V^DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to G. Fred 
Metos, Attorney for Defendant, 72 East 400 South #330, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this [^ day of May, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Louie Edwin SIMS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890463-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 15, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Juab County, George E. 
Ballif, J., of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute for value, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that (1) roadblock at 
which defendant's vehicle was stopped vio-
lated both Fourth Amendment and Utah 
Constitution, and (2) defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle, made after vehicle was 
stopped at illegal roadblock, was arrived at 
by exploitation of roadblock, and was inval-
id. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, J., filed specially concurring 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law «»1031(1) 
Issue of whether roadblock conducted 
by police violated Federal and State Consti-
tutions was properly preserved for appeal, 
although State admitted that roadblock 
was unconstitutional for sake of argument, 
where defendant argued unconstitutionali-
ty of roadblock throughout proceeding and 
there was ample factual record from which 
issue could be assessed. Const Art 1, 
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures c=»18 
Roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is 
"seizure" under Fourth Amendment and 
Utah Constitution. Const Art 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Searches and Seizures *»60 
Utah statutes governing vehicle in-
spections, regulation of traffic, and stops 
STATE v. SIMS Utah 141 
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based on reasonable suspicion did not apply 
in determining whether suspicionless inves-
tigatory roadblocks were permissible. 
Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 4, 14; U.C.A.1953, 23-20-19, 27-
10-4(lXb), 27-12-19, 41-l-17(c), 77-7-15. 
4. Searches and Seizures «»60 
Suspicionless, investigatory roadblock 
in which vehicles and drivers were screened 
for possible violations of law violated 
Fourth Amendment; no explicit plan, be-
yond determination that all vehicles other 
than large trucks were to be stopped, gov-
erned roadblock, officers who authorized 
roadblock were not politically accountable 
officials, and there was no indication that 
authorization process involved balancing 
Fourth Amendment interests and law en-
forcement interest or assessment of effec-
tiveness of roadblock in meeting those in-
terests. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures *»11, 23 
Fourth Amendment balancing test ap-
plies to warrantless seizures that, if not 
based upon articulable suspicion of individ-
ual, must be carried out pursuant to plan 
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on 
conduct of individual officers; additionally, 
such plan should be developed by politically 
accountable officials with unique under-
standing of and responsibility for, limited 
public resources, including finite number of 
police officers. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures $»60 
Politically accountable officials, not the 
courts, are responsible for performing ini-
tial balancing between Fourth Amendment 
and interests served by plan authorizing 
roadblock. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures «=*60 
Suspicionless, investigatory motor ve-
hicle roadblocks, conducted without legisla-
tive authorization, are per se unconstitu-
tional under search and seizure provision of 
Utah Constitution. Const Art 1, § 14. 
8. Criminal Law «=>394.6(2) 
Unless ground for suppression is un-
known or unavailable to defendant at time 
suppression motion is filed, right to chal-
lenge admission of evidence on that ground 
142 Utah 808 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
is waived. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Re-
pealed). 
9. Criminal Law *=>1031(1) 
Defendant's failure to argue at trial 
that there was insufficient attenuation be-
tween his consent to search of his automo-
bile and initial illegal stop of vehicle at 
roadblock did not preclude consideration of 
issue on appeal, where, because of then-
standing decisions effectively holding that 
noncoerced consent to search, by itself, 
purged the taint of primary illegality, 
nonattenuation argument was unavailable 
at trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Repealed). 
10. Searches and Seizures *»184 
Defendant's consent to search of his 
vehicle, made after vehicle was stopped at 
illegal roadblock, was arrived at by exploi-
tation of roadblock, and was invalid; con-
sent was obtained within minutes of illegal 
stop, and defendant did not spontaneously 
volunteer his consent. Const. Art 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
G. Fred Metos (Argued), Yengich, Rich, 
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R. 
Larsen (Argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 




Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction 
of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8<l)(aXi) (Supp.1988), a 
second degree felony. Sims claims the 
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal 
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appel-
late courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (re-
versing State v. Arroyo, 770 ?2d 153 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989)); State v. Earl 716 ?2d 803 (Utah 
1986); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). See also United States v. Corral, 
899 FJd 991 (10th Cir.1990). Besides the 
present case, at least one other case involving 
an automobile search by Sergeant Mangelson is 
stop of his vehicle in a roadblock conducted 
by the Utah Highway Patrol was an unrea-
sonable seizure under the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Con-
stitution. 
Following oral argument, three cases rel-
evant to the issues presented in this appeal 
were decided. Those cases are Michigan 
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. , 
110 S.Ct 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); 
and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' mo-
tion for supplemental briefing. Having 
considered the supplemental briefs, we now 
reverse his conviction, and remand for a 
new trial in which evidence Beized from 
Sims' vehicle is to be suppressed. 
FACTS 
On the morning of July 27,1988, officers 
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab 
County Sheriffs Office conducted a road-
block on Interstate Highway 15 approxi-
mately two miles south of Nephi, Utah. 
The roadblock was planned and supervised 
by Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul 
Mangelson.1 Its purpose was to detect 
driver's license, automobile registration, 
and equipment violations, as well as liquor 
and drug violations. Notice that the road-
block would take place was published in the 
Juab County Times News two to four 
weeks prior to the roadblock. There was 
no evidence that the News was distributed 
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a 
major north-south route and link between 
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. 
According to Mangelson, no written poli-
cy, from the Highway Patrol or from any 
pending in this court State v. Kitchen, No. 
900307-CA. As a central player in at least five 
published search and seizure scenarios to date, 
the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approach-
ing that of Max 25, a narcotics detection dog 
whose nose for crime has figured in at least 
seven published federal cases in the District of 
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer, 
878 R2d 469, 471 and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989), and 
cases cited therein. 
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other source, existed to guide the conduct 
of the roadblock in question. Mangelson 
indicated that his supervising lieutenant 
had given him permission to conduct the 
roadblock. 
The roadblock was staffed by about ten 
uniformed officers. A series of three signs 
within a one-half mile distance directed 
drivers to the roadblock, r^rked by orange 
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, be-
cause stopping them might cause hazard-
ous traffic congestion. Sergeant Mangel-
son instructed officers to inspect driver's 
licenses and vehicle registration of the 
stopped motorists; while doing this, they 
were to watch for signs of liquor and drug 
violations. Officers could hold vehicles for 
further investigation if the initial contact 
raised questions. One of the officers, 
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his 
practice also included asking ail drivers, 
regardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol, 
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2 
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' ve-
hicle, a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the 
roadblock. Trooper Howard, the first offi-
cer to contact Sims, saw nothing to cause 
him to suspect a violation of the law as 
Sims' vehicle approached.8 Howard asked 
for Sims' driver's license and vehicle regis-
tration. Sims produced a valid Georgia 
driver's license and a Utah registration in 
his name. In response to the trooper's 
question, Sims stated that he was en route 
from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City. While 
talking with Sims, Trooper Howard smelled 
alcohol inside the sedan and saw an "open" 
liquor bottle in the back seat area. He 
asked Sims if there were any alcohol, weap-
ons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admitted 
that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but 
denied carrying drugs or weapons. 
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the 
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to 
this question could prompt Trooper Howard to 
then seek consent to search automobiles with-
out any other suspicion of wrongdoing: 
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity, did 
anybody answer "yes" [to query about alco-
hol, weapons, or contraband] when every, 
thing appeared in order so you would have to 
conduct a further search? 
Howard then asked Sims to exit the se-
dan, and asked for consent to look inside. 
Sims consented. Sergeant Mangelson ap-
proached and helped Howard search the 
car's interior. They discovered the rem-
nants of one or two marijuana cigarettes in 
the right rear passenger door ashtray. Ho-
ward then asked Sims if he would mind if 
they searched the trunk of the sedan. 
Sims agreed and opened the trunk. Man-
gelson searched the trunk while Howard 
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims near-
by. 
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson 
discovered two small plastic bags contain-
ing marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly 
nervous, then stated that he wanted the 
search stopped. Mangelson told Sims that, 
based on the discovery of marijuana, he 
had probable cause to continue searching 
the trunk. Looking in the spare tire well, 
Mangelson found a kilogram brick of co-
caine. Sims was then arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to sup-
press all evidence seized from his vehicle, 
contending that the roadblock stop was an 
unlawful seizure under the Utah and feder-
al constitutions and that the officers lacked 
probable cause to search the trunk. Fol-
lowing an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied Sims' motion. The court de-
termined that (1) the roadblock stop did not 
violate the Utah or federal constitutions; 
(2) Sims voluntarily consented to the search 
of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3) 
Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to 
continue searching the trunk after Sims' 
withdrawal of consent. Based on the evi-
dence presented at the suppression hearing 
and on the parties' written stipulation to 
the evidence, the trial court found Sims 
A (Trooper Howard): 
people do that. 
Yes. I've had several 
3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by 
defense counsel included the following ex-
change: 
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] was 
doing anything wrong as he entered the road-
block or breaking any law; is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
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guilty of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the road-
block stop of his vehicle violated his right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution; 
and (2) there was insufficient attenuation 
between the unlawful detention and any 




Sims' first point on appeal deals solely 
with the permissibility of the roadblock it-
self. Because it is undisputed that the 
roadblock was conducted with neither a 
warrant nor suspicion of wrongdoing by 
Sims, and that no emergency situation ne-
cessitated it, the question of whether the 
roadblock was improper is reduced to one 
of law, and we review it without deference 
to the trial court. Scharf i>. BUG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). 
The State neither contests nor accepts 
Sims' arguments that the roadblock violat-
ed the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the 
State invites us to decide this case solely on 
the basis of the attenuation issue. That is, 
we are to "assum[e] arguendo that the stop 
was illegal," and remand this case for fact 
finding on whether Sims' consent to search 
his vehicle was obtained through exploita-
tion of the stop. 
[1] We believe it inappropriate in this 
case, however, to simply assume that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional, without 
analysis. Sims has steadfastly and thor-
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional 
concerns in his argument, Sims has answered 
calls by Utah's appellate courts for a state con-
stitutional analysis of search and seizure issues. 
See, e.g„ Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. 
oughly argued the unconstitutionality of 
the roadblock, on both federal and state 
grounds, throughout these proceedings.4 
The transcript of the suppression hearing 
and the trial court's written findings on the 
issue provide an ample factual record from 
which we can assess the constitutionality 
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, 
has been properly preserved and squarely 
presented on appeal. 
We are aware of the rule that we should 
avoid addressing constitutional issues un-
less required to do so. State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This 
roadblock, however, was not an isolated 
incident, and our police may continue to use 
suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforce-
ment tool.5 This makes all Utah motorists 
subject to closer police scrutiny than they 
might expect or, arguably, be legitimately 
required to encounter. 
[2] The right of citizens to be secure 
from unreasonable seizures "shall not be 
violated/* U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah 
Const art I, § 14 (emphasis added). A 
roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is a sei-
zure under the fourth amendment, Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. 
, 110 S.Ct 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah CtApp. 1990); there is no reason to 
hold otherwise with respect to our state 
constitution. For the benefit of our citi-
zens, as well as that of police charged with 
enforcing our laws, it behooves us to decide 
whether the roadblock that netted Sims 
was constitutionally permissible. We hold 
that it was not. 
Statutory Authority to Conduct Road-
blocks. 
13] A prelude to the constitutional 
analysis per se is a determination of wheth-
er any statutory authority either permits or 
prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted 
here, that is, a suspicionless, investigatory 
roadblock in which vehicles and drivers are 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) (citing cases). 
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 ?2d 489 (Utah 
CtApp.1990). 
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screened for possible violations of law.6 and general inspection 
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We note several statutes of interest, but 
none apply here. 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
operates ports of entry at which all large 
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock 
are stopped and inspected for, among other 
things, driver qualifications, registration, 
tax payments, size and weight, and safety. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19 (Supp.1990). 
Our fish and game laws give the Division 
of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks 
or game checking stations under Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-20-19 (1984), which makes 
it unlawful to fail to stop at such stations. 
These provisions are obviously inapplicable 
here. 
We also note that the Utah Highway 
Patrol is charged with the duty of "regu-
lat[ing] traffic on all highways and roads 
of the state." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-10-4(lXb) (1989). This provision 
might authorize roadblock-type operations 
at, for example, accident scenes, or where 
hazardous road or traffic conditions require 
extra control. However, because this sec-
tion in no way implies authority to conduct 
investigatory operations, it does not apply 
here. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) allows 
a peace officer to "stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable sus-
picion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions."7 Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-l-17(c) (1988) requires officers to stop 
a vehicle for driver's license, registration, 
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock, 
it does not fit into the traditional "three levels" 
of police stops, that have been described as 
follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at [any 
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an "artic-
ulable suspicion" that the person has commit-
ted or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the "detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
upon reasonable 
belief that any vehicle is being operated in 
violation of any provision of this act or of 
any other law regulating the operation of 
vehicles " These codifications of the 
familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were clearly not enact-
ed with roadblock-type stops in mind; rath-
er, they apply to the singling out of partic-
ular individuals or vehicles by the police, 
based on particularized suspicion. 
We find nothing in the Utah code that 
specifically prohibits the roadblock that 
was conducted here, however. Therefore, 
we query whether the roadblock was con-
stitutionally prohibited. 
Fourth Amendment 
14] In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 99 S.Ct 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court implied 
that roadblock stops for the purpose of 
checking driver's licenses and vehicle regis-
trations might be constitutionally permit-
ted. Holding that a routine stop of an 
individual vehicle for such purpose, without 
articulable individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing, was impermissible under the 
fourth amendment, the Court commented 
that "[t]his holding does not preclude the 
State of Delaware or other States from 
developing methods for spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at road-
block-type stops is one possible alterna-
tive." Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
J 987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 
Merrill, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), cert, 
denied, 476 VS. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 
696 (1986)). The level of individualized suspi-
cion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one 
stop. However, since drivers were required to 
stop and had no opportunity to decline to par-
ticipate, the roadblock stop went well beyond a 
level one encounter. It did not, however, quali-
fy as a level two or three stop, since no individu-
alized suspicion prompted the stop. 
7. This provision has been characterized as a 
legislatively enacted version of the so-called lev-
el two stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah CuApp.1990); note 6 supra. 
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The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears, 
and in Sitz, the Court considered an investi-
gatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint," 
operated by the Michigan State Police De-
partment. The checkpoint was operated 
under guidelines created by a special state 
advisory committee composed of law en-
forcement officials and transportation re-
searchers from the University of Michigan. 
Those guidelines governed checkpoint pub-
licity, site selection, and police procedure at 
the checkpoint itself. Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 
2483-84. 
Under the guidelines, all motorists trav-
eling through the checkpoint were stopped 
and briefly checked for intoxication. Only 
if the initial examination revealed signs of 
intoxication would a motorist would be di-
rected out of the traffic flow for a driver's 
license and registration check and further 
sobriety tests. The Sitz checkpoint was 
maintained for one hour and fifteen min-
utes. During that time, 126 vehicles were 
stopped for an average of twenty-five sec-
onds each. The checkpoint yielded two ar-
rests—approximately one and one-half per-
cent of stopped drivers—for driving under 
the influence. Id. at 2484. 
Utilizing a balancing test developed in 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 
(1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 
S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Su-
preme Court held that Michigan's sobriety 
checkpoint passed fourth amendment mus-
ter. The brief detention of motorists at the 
checkpoint was found to be only a "slight" 
infringement of their fourth amendment 
interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 2486. Out-
weighing this infringement were "the mag-
nitude of the drunken driving problem 
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it," 
id. at 2485, along with the Court's assess-
ment that the one and one-half percent 
drunk driver arrest rate demonstrated that 
the checkpoint adequately advanced that 
interest. Id. at 2487-88; see also Brown, 
443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct at 2640 and 
cases cited therein (permissibility of non-ar-
S. The court's definition of the public interest 
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug traffick-
ing, appears to be contrary to testimony about 
the generalized purposes of the roadblock. 
rest seizure requires weighing public inter-
est served thereby, degree to which it 
serves the interest, and severity of interfer-
ence with individual liberty). 
According to the testimony of Sergeant 
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the road-
block in the present case was of an "all-
purpose" variety. All vehicles except 
trucks were checked for licenses, registra-
tion, equipment problems, driver sobriety, 
and signs of illicit drugs, without any sus-
picion of wrongdoing. The trial court, fo-
cusing on the last purpose, performed a 
balancing test as described above. It held 
that "a history of escalating drug traffic 
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a 
result of other arrests, tends to legitimize 
the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers 
to minimize the burden to individual citi-
zens without discretion to engage in ran-
dom roving stops."8 Without passing 
judgment on the accuracy of the trial 
court's balancing, we believe that analysis 
was premature and therefore erroneous. 
15,6] As we read Sitz, Martinez-
Fuerte, and Brown, a fourth amendment 
balancing test applies to warrantless sei-
zures that, if not based upon articulable 
suspicion of an individual, "must be carried 
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, 
neutral limitations on the conduct of indi-
vidual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 
S.Ct at 2640 (emphasis added). Additional-
ly, such a plan should be developed by 
"politically accountable officials" with a 
"unique understanding of, and a responsi-
bility for, limited public resources, includ-
ing a finite number of police officers." 
Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 2487. Those officials, and 
not the courts, are responsible iOT perform-
ing the initial balancing between the fourth 
amendment and the interests served by the 
plan. Id. While the Sitz sobriety check-
point met these requirements, the road-
block used here did not 
No explicit plan, beyond a determination 
that all vehicles other than large trucks 
There was no finding as to the actual efficacy of 
the roadblock in meeting the public purposes 
described by the officers or the more specific 
purposes identified by the court. 
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were to be stopped, governed this road-
block.9 Nor does it appear that Sergeant 
Mangelson or the lieutenant who gave him 
permission to conduct the roadblock are 
politically accountable officials as contem-
plated in Sitz.™ The process by which the 
roadblock was authorized also lacked fea-
tures of political accountability that were 
arguably present in Sitz: the Sitz road-
block was authorized pursuant to careful 
advance study that included non-police pub-
lic officials, while authority for this road-
block arose solely within a police agency. 
Finally, there is no indication that the au-
thorization process here involved any bal-
ancing of fourth amendment interests and 
law enforcement interests, or an assess-
ment of the effectiveness of the roadblock 
in meeting those interests. Instead, the 
lack of any written guidelines arising from 
the authorization process strongly sug-
gests that no such analysis took place. 
The requirement of explicit guidelines, 
developed in a politically accountable man-
ner that includes balancing of the relevant 
concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to 
any judicial balancing analysis of a suspi-
cionless roadblock.11 After-the-fact judicial 
balancing of the interests implicated by 
9. While we understand that allowing large 
trucks to bypass the roadblock may be neces-
sary for safety's sake, we wonder about the 
implications of this procedure for effective drug 
interdiction. The procedure seems to invite 
drug traffickers to transport their contraband in 
large trucks, and possibly relatively massive 
quantities, to avoid detection. 
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 
1389 (10th Cir.1987), upholding the constitution-
ality of a roadblock for the purpose of checking 
driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insur-
ance, pursuant only to the permission of a state 
police supervisor. Corral does not cite Browns 
requirement, adopted in Sitz, of a plan explicitly 
limiting officer discretion. In view of the reit-
eration of that requirement we find in Sitz, we 
do not accept Corral's implication that supervi-
sory permission to conduct a roadblock consti-
tutes an adequate "plan." 
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden, 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989), which, in turn, 
was relied on by the trial court in holding the 
roadblock in this case constitutional. McFayden 
involved "traffic control" roadblocks set up to 
deal with traffic congestion associated with 
street level drug trafficking. The McFayden 
roadblocks were found to pass the reasonable-
ness balancing test of Brown. Those road-
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such a roadblock cannot make it constitu-
tionally proper. Therefore, we hold that 
the roadblock in which Sims was detained 
violated the fourth amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution.12 
Utah Constitution Article /, Section 1J>. 
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guide-
lines stresses the principle that when police 
operations interfere with fourth amend-
ment interests, "the discretion of the offi-
cial in the field [must] be circumscribed, at 
least to some extent." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (citations omit-
ted). Sitz implicitly places both guideline 
development and the decision to utilize sus-
picionless roadblocks in the first place in 
the hands of "politically accountable" offi-
cials. We view roadblock authorization 
and guideline development as separate 
steps, however. The initial decision to per-
mit suspicionless roadblocks is especially 
critical, and requires a higher degree of 
political accountability than the guideline 
development step. Sims argues that the 
lack of statutory authority renders suspi-
cionless roadblocks improper under the 
blocks, again in contrast to the present situa-
tion, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated 
plan developed by five District of Columbia po-
lice districts. 
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached 
by viewing the roadblock as an "administrative 
search." Supreme Court cases dealing with 
such searches have focused on the balance be-
tween the need for such searches and the fourth 
amendment values implicated by such searches. 
However, the cases also involved situations 
where the challenged search was, at least argu-
ably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 
U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct 774, 25 UEd.2d 60 (1970) (fed-
eral statute); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 LEd.2d 930 (1967) 
(city housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) 
(city building code). 
12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other 
federal cases should not be taken as approval of 
the analysis employed, or result reached, in 
these cases. We merely accede to the preemi-
nent position of the United States Supreme 
Court in construing the United States Constitu-
tion. 
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Utah Constitution. As regards the initial 
authority to permit such roadblocks, we 
agree. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion is virtually identical to the fourth 
amendment like its federal counterpart, 
it consists of a "reasonableness" clause 
and a "warrant" clause: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no war-
rant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, partic-
ularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying 
the United States Supreme Court's "vacilla-
tion between the warrant approach and the 
reasonableness approach11 regarding auto-
mobile searches, id at 469, reaffirmed its 
commitment to the warrant approach under 
our constitution, stating that "[warrant-
less searches and seizures are per se unrea-
sonable unless exigent circumstances re-
quire action before a warrant can be ob-
tained." Id. at 470 (quoting State v. Chris-
tensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984)). 
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expecta-
tion of privacy in the interior of the subject 
car, parked unattended and unlocked on a 
public street, triggered the application of 
article I, section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. 
Police officers' warrantless opening of the 
car's door to view the vehicle identification 
number on the doorjamb was found to con-
stitute a search subject to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement The 
search was then held improper under arti-
cle I, section 14, because there was no 
threat that the car would disappear before 
13. Our analysis under the Utah Constitution is 
limited to the need for legislative authorization. 
We note, however, that Justice Durham's opin-
ion in Larocco, requires both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances to justify a warrant-
less search and seizure under article I, section 
14, which would seem to prohibit this roadblock 
and others. However, Larocco was a divided 
decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring, 
Justice Stewart concurring in result only, and 
Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. The final 
a warrant could be obtained to look inside 
i t The court held that such "exigent cir-
cumstances,, to support a warrantless 
search did not exist where the car was not 
en route away from the officers' jurisdic-
tion and the suspect had not been alerted to 
police interest in it Id at 470-71. 
Under article I, section 14 our supreme 
court applies a "warrants whenever possi-
ble" policy to motor vehicle searches and 
seizures. Id. This policy is consistent with 
one fundamental purpose of constitutional 
search and seizure limits: the interposition 
of neutral authority between police seeking 
evidence of crimes and the citizens from 
whom such evidence is sought13 
In the usual non-exigent circumstances 
search and seizure scenario, the judicial 
branch, through a magistrate, serves as 
the neutral authority that issues or denies 
a warrant to perform a search or seizure. 
The warrant is issued only when probable 
cause exists. U.S. Const amend. IV; Utah 
Const, art I, § 14. Our state legislature, 
however, has also served as a neutral au-
thority between our police and our citizens, 
in authorizing certain seizures upon less 
than probable cause. 
As already noted, our legislature has fol-
lowed the courts' lead in authorizing brief 
warrantless stops of individuals and motor 
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 
Also as noted, the legislature has acted 
independently in authorizing ports of entry, 
as well as fish and game checkpoints. 
These operations, supported by neither 
warrants nor any level of individualized 
suspicion, clearly implicate article I, section 
14 of our constitution. 
From an operational standpoint, ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints close-
ly resemble the roadblock that was con-
verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, un-
known. 
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988) 
may reflect a determination by our legislature 
to not simply ratify judicial expansion of police 
power by silent acquiescence, but to determine 
through the political process whether such ex-
pansion is to become a part of Utah's law. 
STATE v 
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ducted in this case, in that all large trucks, 
or all vehicles used by hunters, respective-
ly, are submitted to official inspections. 
However, in authorizing these operations, 
our legislature has, presumably, weighed 
the need for such suspicionless inspections 
against their intrusion upon individual lib-
erty,15 a process analogous to that per-
formed by a magistrate in the issuance of a 
warrant A high degree of political ac-
countability for the institution of these 
practices can also be presumed, in that 
representatives of truckers, hunters, law 
enforcement, and the citizenry at large all 
very likely played a part in passing the 
relevant statutes. 
In each case of legislation authorizing 
specific types of checkpoints or stops of 
persons or vehicles, with or without individ-
ualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the citi-
zens of this state have acted through their 
elected representatives. Therefore, the col-
lective will of the people is expressed and, 
furthermore, the people have notice of duly 
authorized police activity. 
In stark contrast, the roadblock conduct-
ed in this case was authorized solely by 
police officers, the very people whose be-
havior article I, section 14 is intended to 
limit. No non-law enforcement officials 
took part in the decision to set up the 
roadblock. Leaving the initial decision to 
conduct such operations in police hands cre-
ates a scheme that is both unrealistic and 
constitutionally untenable. 
[7] We believe that legislative authori-
zation of ports of entry and fish and game 
checkpoints, like the issuance of a judicial 
warrant, triggers at least some presump-
tion that these law enforcement practices 
are constitutionally permissible. Because 
the roadblock in this case had neither form 
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the 
legislature appears to have weighed liberty con-
cerns with some care. Vehicles normally sub-
ject to these stops are exempted from stopping if 
doing so would increase their one-way trip dis-
tance by more than three miles or five percent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19.4(1) and (3) (Supp. 
1990). 
16. In Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 
(R.I.1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 
Pa^uper. 306, 502 K2& 221 (1985), the Rhode 
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of authorization, it was entitled to no such 
presumption. Both warrants and statutes 
originate outside the executive branch, 
serving to check abuses of that branch's 
law enforcement power. Consistent with 
our supreme court's emphasis on the war-
rant requirement, then, we hold that suspi-
cionless, investigatory motor vehicle road-
blocks, conducted without legislative autho-
rization, are per se unconstitutional under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
In requiring legislative authority as a 
prerequisite to the use of suspicionless in-
vestigatory roadblocks, we join two other 
western states that have similarly con-
strued their constitutions. See, e.g.. State 
v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 
(1988); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 
743 P.2d 692 (1987).16 At least one other 
state has established the same standard 
under the fourth amendment. State v. 
Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.App.1984). This 
approach is particularly appropriate where 
a proposed police practice will, as here, 
affect everyone traveling our state's high-
ways. Because of its close ties to the 
citizens whose rights will be affected, the 
minimum necessary political accountability 
for such practices lies, at the outset, with 
our legislature. 
Our holding that article I, section 14 pro-
hibits suspicionless investigative road-
blocks without legislative authority, in ef-
fect, requires the legislature to perform the 
Sitz -type balancing function if and when it 
decides to consider the authorization of 
such roadblocks. Judicial balancing of the 
interests implicated by such roadblocks, 
then, will need to occur only if and when 
the legislature, upon performing such bal-
ancing itself, decides to authorize them.17 
Island Supreme Court and the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints uncon-
stitutional under their state constitutions with-
out considering whether such practices could be 
valid if statutorily authorized. 
17. We note that the factors to be considered in 
performing such balancing are myriad, com-
plex, and subject to debate. See, eg., Sitz and 
dissenting opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.; 
Nelson v. Lane County, 743 ?2d at 710-11 (ap-
pendix); see also Davis & Wallentine, A Model 
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We, unlike our colleague in his concurring 
opinion, prefer that the legislature an-
nounce its view of public policy and the 
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards 
roadblocks, prior to the court applying con-
stitutional analysis to the legislature's 
product.18 
We also emphasize that our holding on 
the state constitutionality of the roadblock 
in which Sims was stopped is limited in its 
application to similar, non-emergency situa-
tions. It is not intended to apply to emer-
gency roadblocks that might, for example, 
be used to apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor 
do we intend to impede any existing au-
thority to conduct roadblocks for traffic 
control purposes. Any constitutional chal-
lenge to these types of traffic stops awaits 
another day. It is the suspicionless, inves-
tigative, non-emergency roadblock, con-
ducted in the absence of legislative authori-
ty, that we hold to be unconstitutional. 
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM 
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Sims argues that there was. insufficient 
attenuation between his detention and the 
consent he gave to search his vehicle to 
purge the taint of the illegality of the de-
tention. He does not claim that his consent 
was coerced from him and was therefore 
involuntary. Rather, he argues that be-
cause there were no intervening circum-
stances between the detention and the con-
sent, the consent was the fruit of the il-
legal detention, and, therefore, evidence 
seized pursuant to his consent should have 
been ordered suppressed. Sims did not 
make this argument in the trial court 
[8,9] Normally, "where a defendant 
fails to assert a particular ground for sup-
pressing unlawfully obtained evidence in 
the trial court, an appellate court will not 
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety 
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.UJJPubJL 357 
(1989). Political and economic considerations 
that are the particular province of the legisla-
ture may also come into play: Utah's economy 
benefits greatly from tourism, and the state is 
also currently attempting to attract the Winter 
Olympic Games. Our legislators may well wish 
to consider the possible impact of suspicionless 
roadblocks upon visitors to our state. 
consider that ground on appeal." State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see 
also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n. 2 
(Utah CtApp.1990); Utah R.Crirn.P. 12. 
Unless a ground for suppression is "un-
known or unavailable1' to a defendant at 
the time a suppression motion is filed, the 
right to challenge the admission of evi-
dence on that ground is waived. State v. 
Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, 
however, because our then-standing deci-
sions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint 
of a primary illegality, Sims' non-attenua-
tion argument was unavailable to him in 
the trial court and would have been point-
less to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah CtApp.1988). There-
fore, it is proper to address that argument 
now. 
In State t>. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing 
this court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.App.1989), held 
that, to be constitutionally valid, a search 
consent following illegal police behavior 
must be both non-coerced and not arrived 
at by exploitation of the primary police 
illegality. Factors used to evaluate the 
non-exploitation or attenuation element are 
derived from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), 
which involved a confession obtained from 
a criminal suspect after his illegal arrest. 
They include the temporal proximity of the 
primary illegality and the granting of con-
sent, the presence or absence of interven-
ing circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (citing 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct at 
2261-62, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)). 
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states 
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our 
automobiles than in other states or in the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's enunciation of the 
"automobile exception" under the fourth 
amendment. See California v. Carney, 471 VS. 
386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). 
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[10] The Arroyo case was remanded to 
the trial court for fact finding on the issue 
of whether the defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle was attenuated from or 
an exploitation of his illegal stop. Because 
the burden is on the State to show that 
evidence obtained following illegal police 
conduct is attenuated from the illegality, 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 
and because the attenuation issue was not 
presented to the trial court, a remand to 
examine the attenuation factors has been 
suggested here. We find, however, that 
the record now before us contains "suffi-
cient detail and depth" to allow us to deter-
mine the issue as a matter of law. See id. 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, 
the record demonstrates a very short time 
span between Sims' stop in the roadblock 
and Trooper Howard's request to search 
his automobile. The trooper had but a 
brief conversation with Sims, regarding his 
license and registration, his trip itinerary, 
and possession of alcohol, guns, or contra-
band, before asking for consent to search 
his car. The consent was obtained within 
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even 
under our clear error standard of review 
could the trial court find enough time be-
tween the stop and the grant of consent to 
attenuate the relationship between the 
two.19 
Nor does the record reveal any possibili-
ty of intervening circumstances between 
the illegal stop and Sims' grant of consent 
to the search. Such circumstances must be 
independent of the primary illegality. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Here, Trooper 
Howard's request for consent to search 
Sims' sedan was based upon the smell of 
alcohol, the sight of the open liquor bottle 
in the sedan, and Sims' admission, une-
ventful since the bottle was in obvious 
view, that he was carrying alcohol. Ho-
ward's opportunity to make these observa-
19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less 
than two hours between an illegal arrest and the 
obtaining of an incriminating statement from 
the arrestee was viewed as insufficient to atten-
uate the statement from the arrest. 422 US. at 
604, 95 S.O. at 2262. 
20. Additionally. Trooper Howard testified that, 
once the open container was discovered, Sims 
tions and to question Sims, however, de-
pended entirely on the illegal roadblock. 
Neither Sims' driving nor the external ap-
pearance of his vehicle justified stopping 
him. Nothing occurred which could have 
reasonably made him feel free to proceed 
on his journey at any time between the 
moment of his stop and the discoveries that 
prompted the tro?:>*r's request for consent 
to search his vehicle.20 Sims did not spon-
taneously volunteer his consent, but gave it 
only when asked. Sims' consent, then, 
arose from an unbroken chain of events 
that began with the illegal roadblock. 
The final factor in the attenuation analy-
sis is an examination of the purpose and 
flagrancy of the primary police illegality. 
Here, this factor, unlike the first two, ap-
pears unrelated to the question of whether 
a search consent flowed from, i.e., was an 
exploitation of, the illegal police conduct21 
Instead, it appears to be an alternative 
approach, inviting us to overlook unconsti-
tutional police conduct that serves good 
purposes and is not too flagrant. 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testi-
fied at some length about their expertise in 
drug interdiction, and the trial court treat-
ed the roadblock as if that was its primary 
purpose. However noble this purpose 
might be, it was pursued by an unautho-
rized means. The troopers each had years 
of law enforcement experience, and can 
properly be charged with awareness that 
their action was not authorized by law. 
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding." 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 573, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to 
twelve law officers to staff the roadblock 
may have also left distant parts of the 
largely rural jurisdiction with delayed po-
lice assistance in the event of need. Thus, 
was, in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to 
citation and to field sobriety testing. 
21. By contrast, in Brvwn v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest, 
that appeared "calculated to cause surprise, 
fright, and confusion/' 422 US. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 
at 2262, as a causative factor producing the 
arrestee's subsequent incriminating statements. 
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although it does not appear that the offi-
cers behaved abusively toward those 
stopped at the roadblock, this does not cor-
rect the constitutional violation. 
In sum, the record demonstrates that 
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was 
arrived at by exploitation of the illegal 
roadblock. Accordingly, that consent was 
invalid. Because the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to violations of both the fourth 
amendment and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidence 
obtained under that consent must be sup-
pressed. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
CONTINUE SEARCH 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson be-
lieved that the discovery of marijuana in 
Sims' sedan under the consent search gave 
them probable cause to continue searching 
after consent was withdrawn. However, 
because the initial consent was invalid, any 
probable cause found while searching un-
der that consent was also invalid. Absent 
probable cause to search the sedan without 
Sims' consent, we need not reach the issue 
of whether exigent circumstances existed 
to make the warrant requirement inapplica-
ble. 
CONCLUSION 
Sims' conviction for possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute 
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for proceedings in accord with 
this opinion. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (coacvurring specially)-. 
While I otherwise concur fully in the 
court's opinion, I have two difficulties with 
the discussion treating the roadblock under 
article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitu-
tion. First, if the roadblock cannot even be 
validated under the questionable "bal-
ancing" approach of Michigan v. Sitz, —-
U.S. , 110 S.Ct 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 
(1990), see, e.g.t id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), we have no need to examine 
whether it might be additionally invalid un-
der the state constitution. Second, and 
more importantly, I am not enthusiastic 
about suggesting that the legislature, any 
more than the courts or the police, should 
be about the business of balancing away 
important constitutional protections that 
safeguard all of us so that law enforce-
ment can more readily catch an occasional 
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free 
from police intrusion in the total absence of 
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing 
should simply not be at the mercy of the 
legislature's determination of how tourism 
or our hopes for the Olympics might some-
how be adversely impacted by one law en-
forcement technique or another. 
If it were necessary to reach the state 
constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the 
roadblock passed muster under the federal 
constitution, I would be more inclined to 
solidify long-standing constitutional pre-
cepts as at the core of article I, section 14, 
than to borrow the troublesome "bal-
ancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt 
some variation of that approach, and begin 
a journey down that nebulous path. Cf. 
State v, Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 
1990) (state constitutional analysis em-
ployed "to simplify . . . the search and sei-
zure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and the courts and, 
at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures"). I would probably prefer to hold 
that the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), uni-
formly applied by Utah courts, is a matter 
of Utah constitutional law that simply may 
not be balanced away by any branch of our 
government and that is not amenable to a 
roadblock exception. 
Under established Utah decisional law, in 
the absence of any individualized suspicion, 
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., 
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 
CtApp.1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 570 (Utah CtApp.1990); State v. Tru-
jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). A level one stop is a purely volun-
tary encounter. Id And one does not lose 
GOTTFREDSON v. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BD 
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the right to decline to participate in a level 
one encounter simply because one chooses 
to drive rather than to walk. See State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah CtApp. 
1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah CtApp.1989), rev'd on other 
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). See 
also, Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648, 
663, 99 S.Ct 1391, 1401, 59 LEd.2d 660 
(1979) (persons do not lose the protections 
of fourth amendment "when they step 
from the sidewalk into their automobiles"); 
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491, 494 
(Utah CtApp.1990). 
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If, as seems clear, the police cannot re-
quire every pedestrian on a stretch of side-
walk to stop and answer police inquiries, I 
am hard-pressed to see how they can stop 
every car on a stretch of the interstate 
highway and require the driver to answer 
inquiries. In my view, the only roadblock 
that is sure to pass state constitutional 
muster is one which would qualify as a 
level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 Md. 
485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock 
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock 
or otherwise refusing to cooperate not de-
tained). I see no constitutional problem 
with a roadside police checkpoint an-
nounced by a sign on the freeway, "Police 
Roadblock Next Exit Your Cooperation in 
Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated." 
Most drivers would stop, even though they 
could not be required to, just as most pe-
destrians will stop and respond to police 
inquiries on the sidewalk. But on neither 
medium of travel can one suspected of 
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to 
do so. 
f O | MY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Worker's petition to withdraw his re-
tirement application was denied by the 
State Retirement Board, and worker ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., 
held that: (1) worker's request to cancel his 
application was untimely, and (2) Board had 
no affirmative duty to inform worker of 
proposed legislation which, if passed, could 
substantially affect his benefits. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=>800 
Standard of review on appeal from fi-
nal agency action dealing with statutory 
interpretation presents issue of law, and 
Court of Appeals therefore applies correc-
tion-of-error standard, in which it extends 
no deference to agency's conclusions. 
2. States *=»64.1(3) 
Where worker established on his re-
tirement application his retirement date, 
which date also determined when his bene-
fits would start to accrue, no alteration, 
addition, or cancellation of his benefits 
could be made after that date; thus, be-
cause his request to cancel his application 
was not made until after that date, his 
request was properly refused. U.C.A.1953, 
49-1-603(1). 
3. States *»64.1(3) 
Retirement Board had no affirmative 
duty to inform worker, who had filed his 
retirement application, of proposed legisla-
tion which, if passed, could substantially 
affect his benefits. U.C.A.1953, 49-1-
603(1). 
